ited immunity from federal injunction was accorded to state public utility rate orders 5 and to state tax laws. 6 Added to these congressional limitations were a variety of self-imposed judicial restraints which, when taken together, constitute the doctrine of "equitable abstention." Significant among these is the rule of the Prentis case,' which postpones the availability of federal injunctive relief against state administrative action until the complainant has exhausted his nonjudical remedies." Also of significance is the rule that STAT. i15o, 116z (1911) , superceded by 6z STAT. 928 (1943) , involving an action for declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of a state tax, federal relief was denied, since the taxpayer's right to sue for a refund after payment of a contested tax afforded an adequate remedy in the state courts. The Supreme Court refused to declare whether the Tax Injunction Act could be construed as prohibiting federal declaratory judgments, but was of the opinion that ". . . those considerations which have led federal courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes, save in exceptional cases, require a like restraint in the use of the declaratory judgment procedure." 319 U.S. at z99. See, Comment, 50 YALE L.J. 927 (1940) 'Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 2io (19o8). 'Ibid. In a suit to enjoin a railroad rate order established by a state commission, an appeal was available to the highest state court endowed with legislative powers to change the rate order. As to the propriety of federal injunction prior to such legislative review, the Supreme Court held that federal judicial review must be postponed until all legislative remedies had been exhausted in the state courts. See Porter v. In- an equity court should hesitate to interfere with state criminal proceedings.' Further, abstention is generally required when the problem concerns an area of state law so specialized as to be beyond the competence of federal judges. 10 Not so well defined as these other limitations is an area of equitable (1943) . 10 Judicial opinion varies as to whether it is an exercise of sound equitable discretion to abstain in all cases where the issue underlying the constitutional question is one of highly complicated local law. Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (i950), was a suit to enjoin a state commission from enforcing its ruling denying petitioners the right to discontinue two passenger trains. Allegedly, the order would result in confiscation of property in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of injunction on the grounds that intrastate railroad service regulation is "primarily the concern of the state," and that adequate judicial review was available in the state courts. The Court distinguished the cases in which jurisdiction had been withheld to avoid abstention which comes into focus only when injunction is sought against a state statute as violative of the Federal Constitution.", Here, abstention is primarily rooted in the traditional judicial sentiment that decision of constitutional issues should be avoided whenever possible. 2 This sentiment is intensified in these cases by the realization that a particularly sensitive area of federal-state relations is involved.' 3 A questionable district court decision, now pending on appeal to the Supreme Court, raises the possibility that this problem area will presently receive definitive treatment.
In Doud v. Hodge,'* petitioners, regulated by the provisions of an Illinois act' " controlling those "engaged in the business of selling or premature constitutional decision, and appeared to rely mainly upon principles of comity. Although Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result, believing that petitioner's bill should have been dismissed for failure to state a substantial claim under the Constitution, he vigorously protested the opinion of the Court as a "flagrant contradiction with an unbroken course of decisions in this Court for seventy-five years." 34I U.S. at 362. Perhaps the fact that federal jurisdiction rested on diversity of citizenship in addition to a claim under the Constitution encouraged Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his protest.
See Burford v. Oil Co., 39 U.S. 315, 336 (i943) (dissenting opinion), wherein abstention in recognition of "basic problems of Texas policy" was weighed against diversity of citizenship (in addition to a constitutional claim) jurisdiction.
" Where federal equity jurisdiction can rest on grounds other than a federal constitutional question, the district court will not abstain merely because 
19s61

SNO TES
issuing money orders," 6 sought to enjoin enforcement of that act on the ground that its explicit exemption of the American Express Company was highly discriminatory and violative of the fourteenth amendment.'7 In dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction, a three-judge federal district court held that it could not entertain the cause, absent an authoritative determination by the Illinois Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of the statute." 6 For purposes of analysis, it should be observed that when a federal district court abstains from passing on the constitutionality of a state statute, it awaits one of three possible results. First, the federal constitutional issue might be averted by a narrow state court construction of the statute. Second, the state court might declare the statute constitutional, in which case the complainant would have available an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. And finally, the state court, may, itself, declare the statute violative of the Federal Constitution.
When the first of these possible results of state litigation can be anticipated, equitable abstention would seem to be not only proper, but quite desirable.'
9 By proceeding on the assumption that the state courts will give the statute a narrow, constitutional construction, the federal courts can spare themselves the possible embarrassment of having to announce an altogether tentative decision. 596 (1946) , where it was alleged that a state constitutional amendment outlawing "closed union shops" violated the Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's abstention, and said: "When authoritatively construed, it may or may not have the meaning or force which appellees now assume that it has. In absence of an authoritative interpretation, it is impossible to know with certainty what constitutional issues will finally emerge. What would now be written on the constitutional questions might therefore turn out to be an academic and needless dissertation." See also, Spector Motor Services, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 3z3 U.S.
can adequately support abstention by a three-judge district court only when there exists a substantial probability that a constitutional construction will be put upon the statute by a state court; and unless it is demonstrable that a restrictive interpretation is open to the state courts, such a substantial probability cannot exist.
2 This is not to imply that the federal courts should undertake an express demonstration of the alternative constructions which could save the state statute; for to do so might carry the implication that the district court was announcing a provisional decision on the constitutional question. Nevertheless, the district court should balance the probabilities and abstain only when there is a general sentiment that the constitutional issue will be averted in the state courts.
To the extent that there is abstention in a case where no substantial probability of averting the constitutional issue exists, the federal court is obviously being prompted by something other than the anticipation of a restrictive state court treatment. Abstention in such a case must actually be grounded, instead, in the principles of comity and convenience, 22 which, on the one hand, could impel a federal court to abstain for no other reason than that the state statute had not been construed by the state courts. Some recent Supreme Court cases, in fact, seem to justify their abstention merely on the absence of a state court construction, rather than on the substantial probability of a narrow construction. Co., 312 U.S. 496, 5oo (1941): "The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication." " In Public Utilities Commission of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943) , the Supreme Court affirmed a district court decree enjoining enforcement of a state commission's orders fixing gas rates to be charged for natural gas transported in interstate commerce. As to the possibility of abstaining to await a narrow state court construction of local law, the Court said at p. 463: "9But where... no state court ruling on local law could settle the federal questions that necessarily remain . . . considerations of equity require that the litigation be brought to an end as quickly as possible. 
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On the other hand, principles of comity could also impel a federal court to abstain until the state court passes upon the constitutional issue. 
336 U.S. 368 0949).
The action was initiated in the federal district court in Hawaii to enjoin the enforcement of a territorial act restricting the teaching of foreign languages and the persons allowed to teach them in territorial schools. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the cause to the district court with directions to dismiss the complaint.
. The opinion did not expressly rely on the possibility that construction of the statute by the territorial courts might avert the federal constitutional questions. But some reliance does seem to have been placed on the fact that there had been no local construction of the statute: "The complaint called for broad consideration of the application of the Act to foreign language schools and teachers. It had not been construed by the Hawaiian courts." 336 U.S. 383.
2 "[Eintirely aside from the question of the propriety of an injunction in any court, territorial like state courts are the natural sources for the interpretation of the acts of their legislatures and equally of the propriety of interference by injunction. We think that where equitable interference with state and territorial acts is sought in federal courts, judicial consideration of the acts of importance primarily to the people of a state or territory should as a matter of discretion, be left by the federal courts to the courts of the legislating authority unless exceptional circumstances command a different course. The effect of abstaining solely on principles of comity should be fully appreciated. Since any one of the three possible results of state litigation will render further resort to a three-judge district court unlikely, when the court abstains, it forever surrenders its opportunity of passing on the constitutional issue. Therefore, if the doctrine of equitable abstention is not to be confined to those cases in which state court construction may validate the statute, but rather is to be extended to all cases in which the state court either has not construed the statute or has not passed on the narrow constitutional question, the result will be a judicial elimination of the federal district court as a testing ground for the constitutionality of state legislation. In spite of strong opposition by those who believe that constitutional rights may be adequately safeguarded through Supreme Court review of the highest state court decisions, Congress has refused to abolish the jurisdiction of three-judge district courts .
0
Whether the Supreme Court should contravene that legislative intent purely in deference to the sensitivity of federal-state relations may be doubtful. Doud v. Hodge offers the Court an opportunity to make that choice.
GERALD B. 341 (1951) , Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, at pp. 358-359: "Plainly we are concerned with a jurisdictional issue which has been continuously before Congress and with which it has dealt by explicit and detailed legislation. ... But Congress did not take away the power of the district court to decide a case like the one before us. Instead, it recognized ... that such power was an obligatory jurisdiction, not to be denied because as a matter of policy it might be more desirable to raise such constitutional claims in a state court ....
1956]
